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In the analytic tradition, ‘the problem of personal 
identity’ is usually taken to mean a question of numerical 
identity over time: what makes X at one time the same 
person as Y at another? But the title also fits a set of 
questions - at least as interesting - which concern what 
may be called qualitative identity. A person’s qualitative 
identity comprises his defining properties (DPs): these are 
properties that he must mention in a full answer to the 
question ‘Who am I?’, taken in a special sense which can 
be discerned by contrast with the ordinary sense of the 
third-person ‘Who is X?’ If you and I are watching a 
ceremony and I, pointing to one of the participants, ask 
‘Who is she?’, my purpose is likely to be to find out that 
person’s role in the ceremony: the question and the 
appropriate answer are relative to my purpose, which is set 
by the context. In the sense relevant to DPs, ‘Who am I?’ 
is not thus relative to context and purpose: rather, in 
answering the question I identify properties of mine that 
determine my purposes. There is, however, no simple 
asymmetry between the first-person and the third-person 
questions; the third-person question can, although it rarely 
does, take this sense, and conversely the first-person 
question can be relative to purpose and context, as for 
example where roles in a game are being assigned and 
one of the players is unsure of his role. Nevertheless the 
special sense is more prominent in the first-person case. 
DPs ‘determine’ purposes in a sense that covers 
relations of justification, constitution and causation. 
Suppose it is one of my DPs that I am a devout Catholic: 
then my being one justifies me in having - in the sense of 
being a practical reason for me to have - the purpose of 
going regularly to church; it is a practical reason for me to 
fulfil that purpose; and, assuming that I am practically 
rational, it is a theoretical reason to believe that I have and 
fulfil that purpose. Also, my having the purpose of going 
regularly to church is likely to be part of what it is - 
although it is not a necessary condition - for me to be a 
devout Catholic, and my being one may cause me to form 
the purpose of visiting Rome. To say that DPs determine 
purposes does not imply that a person must first have DPs 
before he can have any purposes: I may acquire a DP, and 
may even do so deliberately, in the course of pursuing an 
existing purpose. If I am set on making money, I may 
decide that the best method is not only to become a 
stockbroker but also to adopt that job as part of my 
qualitative identity. 
The justification of purposes is one role played by 
DPs in practical reasoning. More generally, if F is a DP of 
mine, that I have F is likely often to be an important 
premiss, explicit or implicit, in my practical deliberation. 
Importance can be explicated in various ways, depending 
on the model adopted of practical reasoning. If the 
structure of a person’s practical reasons is conceived by 
analogy with standard models in epistemology, it might be 
viewed as a hierarchy of reasons for action that rest on a 
set of foundational reasons - the person’s ultimate ends - 
or as a web of reasons. On the former view, the 
importance of a premiss will be the greater, the nearer it is 
to the foundation; on the latter view, the nearer it is to the 
centre of the web. 
A wide variety of properties can be DPs. People 
are often defined by their job, or even their former job 
(retired civil servant), or by their occupation in a broader 
sense (housewife, writer). Someone may be defined by 
nationality, by a connection with an institution (alumnus of 
Yale), or by relations - notably ones involving commitments 
or close attachments - to individuals (father of so-and-so). 
Holding a certain belief - in particular a religious or political 
belief - can be a DP, as can having a certain trait of 
character. A DP can be a physical property - being very 
short, for example, or being beautiful. 
The distinction between a person’s DPs and those 
of his properties that do not define him cross-cuts certain 
other distinctions, in particular those between necessary 
and contingent properties and between individuating and 
non-individuating properties. As to the necessary and the 
contingent, it may be a DP of mine that I am an artist, but I 
might not have been one; conversely, it may be a 
necessary property of mine that I have a certain genetic 
code, but this is unlikely to appear in my answer to the 
question ‘Who am I?’ As to individuating and non-
individuating properties, I am not the only artist; 
conversely, even if I have the property of being the only 
man wearing a black hat in Piccadilly at noon on 1 July 
2002, this is unlikely to be one of my DPs. It is a confusion 
of immaturity to try to base one’s qualitative identity on 
uniqueness and thus on a contrast between oneself and 
everyone else. 
The concepts of qualitative identity and of DPs, 
and the special sense of the question ‘Who am I?’, can be 
defined in terms of each other, but they appear to form a 
primitive triad: an explanation in terms of the determination 
of purposes, practical reason and the contrast with 
necessary and individuating properties, or in terms of other 
concepts such as commitment, is not readily sharpened 
into a definition or even into a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. In particular, importance in practical 
reasoning seems, at any rate on a narrow conception of 
practical reasoning, not to be necessary for a property to 
be a DP. If, for example, the DP in question is 
susceptibility to a mood, its connection with action will not 
primarily be rational in any narrow sense. My gloominess 
may affect my actions - and the connection between mood 
and action may be rational in the broad sense that my 
behaviour is appropriate to someone who is gloomy - but 
in deciding what to do I shall not normally reason from the 
premiss that I am gloomy (although I may do so if, for 
example, I am trying to find ways of changing my 
character). Also, in the case of some DPs - such as that of 
being a contemplative hermit - there is no connection with 
action in any narrow sense. Nor is importance in practical 
reasoning sufficient by itself for a property to be a DP. For 
example, the premiss that I desire to stay alive is likely to 
be near the foundation or centre of my structure of 
practical reasons, but the property of desiring to stay alive 
will not normally be a DP of mine. My answer to the 
question ‘Who am I?’ is likely to presuppose, rather than 
mention, this property. 
Even if these concepts cannot be defined in other 
terms, distinctions can be drawn within them, in particular 
between a person’s actual identity, the identity he strives to 
have (projected identity) and the identity he believes he 
ought to have (normative identity). There is a parallel 
distinction between DPs. These qualitative identities 
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interact: for example, actual identity constrains both the 
formation and the achievement of projected identity. 
Someone with the actual identity of a Chinese peasant 
farmer is unlikely ever to have heard of the British 
Parliament, and hence will be unable to strive to have the 
identity of a member of the House of Commons. Even if he 
does have the relevant concepts and thus is able to form 
that projected identity, he is unlikely to be able to achieve 
it. Conversely, projected identity affects actual identity: if I 
constantly strive for an identity beyond my reach, I may 
acquire the actual identity of a loser. Projected identity may 
also affect actual identity through interpretation. Suppose 
that hitherto I have spent my time going to fashionable 
parties. Disgusted with the triviality of my life, I resolve to 
become a novelist and, like Proust, to incorporate my 
experiences of high society in my novels. I accordingly 
reinterpret my life to date not as a waste of time but as a 
necessary period for the collection of material. The 
reinterpretation may involve self-deception - I might 
pretend to myself that I had only ever gone to the parties 
with the intention of collecting material - but need not do 
so. It might be suggested that such cases of interpretation 
connect projected identity not with actual identity but with 
beliefs about it; but, although it is true that there is a 
distinction between who I am and who I think I am, this 
distinction becomes blurred where the ascription of an 
identity involves interpretation. 
The concept of qualitative identity raises many 
issues: for example, whether it is a matter of degree; 
whether everybody has such an identity (see below); 
whether some people have more than one; the senses in 
which qualitative identities and DPs cohere; whether we 
can choose our qualitative identities; whether they are 
socially determined; the distinction, just mentioned, 
between who I am and who I think I am; the extent to 
which we should reflect on our qualitative identities; the 
nature of change of such identity; and - the topic of the rest 
of this paper - the relation between qualitative and 
numerical identity of persons. 
For X to be the same person as Y it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient that X and Y have the same 
qualitative identity. That it is unnecessary is shown, for all 
but very broad conceptions of qualitative identity, by the 
case of the young boy and the old man who are the same 
person but differ in their actual, projected and normative 
identities. It also follows from the proposition that a person 
may lack a qualitative identity. This proposition is plausible 
for projected and normative identity; it seems that I could 
live from day to day without ever considering who I want or 
ought to be. But it also seems possible, if more difficult, to 
live without an actual identity, or at most with only a low 
degree of actual identity: such a condition might be 
described as one of radical irony or detachment. Consider 
a woman who says of her work as a philosopher, ‘It’s fun, 
and I have to earn a living, but I’d have been just as happy 
working in the City’; of her husband, ‘I get on with him, but 
who knows how long we’ll stay together?’; of her 
attendance at synagogue, ‘It’s just a habit I picked up in 
childhood’; and so on. It might be said that, by default, she 
has the identity of an ironist; but that would be inaccurate 
if, say, her irony came in phases between periods of 
commitment, or if she had certain commitments and 
attachments which were nevertheless too weak to ground 
an identity. In support of some weaker version of the claim 
of necessity it might be argued that some radical changes 
of qualitative identity break the thread of numerical identity: 
Parfit’s example of the nineteenth-century Russian, who as 
a young man regards his socialist ideals as essential to 
him but abandons them in middle age, might be described 
in these terms (Parfit 1984, 327-328). But it seems that 
such a description would either be hyperbolical or 
presuppose a revisionist concept of personhood. 
That sameness of qualitative identity is not 
sufficient for numerical identity follows from the fact that 
not only are DPs distinct from individuating properties, as 
noted earlier, but two people can share all the DPs that 
constitute their qualitative identity. You and I may both be 
English aristocratic hypochondriacs who work in banking 
(actual identity), strive to become rich enough to retire as 
country squires (projected identity) and believe that we 
ought to have had military careers (normative identity). 
Qualitative and numerical identity are nevertheless 
connected in significant ways. Standard accounts of the 
latter analyse it in terms of continuity, bodily or 
psychological, but it is sometimes sustained in part by 
continuity of qualitative identity: part of what makes the old 
man the same person as the young boy may be a gradual 
and overlapping change of DPs. ‘Sustained in part’ might 
here be glossed in terms of a condition more complex than 
a necessary or sufficient condition - possibly, in some 
cases, an ‘inus’ condition in Mackie’s sense: an insufficient 
but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient 
condition (Mackie 1974, 62). The relations between 
continuity of qualitative identity and the other forms of 
continuity differ from case to case; where the DPs include 
psychological properties, the same factors - say, a gradual 
change of character - may partly constitute both 
psychological continuity and continuity of qualitative 
identity. 
Conversely, numerical identity at least sometimes 
partly sustains qualitative identity. Certain DPs must of 
their nature be possessed for an extended period: the 
property of having a given character trait is an example; 
another is any DP involving a commitment. I cannot be 
kind-hearted, or committed to a religious life, merely for an 
instant. It seems in fact that no property possessed for an 
instant is fit to be a DP. There was an instant at which 
Armstrong stepped on to the moon, but the relevant DP 
here is not the fleeting property of stepping on to the moon 
but the enduring one of being the first person to have 
stepped on to it. Possession of a DP therefore 
presupposes numerical identity through the relevant 
minimum period. 
There is a further connection between qualitative 
and numerical identity. The existence of a person who can 
be reidentified over time entails a degree of integration of 
his properties, specifically those of having certain mental 
states: as integration declines, the person subsides into 
madness and at a certain point ceases to exist. It is 
plausible to hold that such integration in its higher degrees 
may partly consist of coherence among DPs and 
qualitative identities. 
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